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:''For other Winograd Commissions, see Eliyahu Winograd.'' The Winograd Commission ((ヘブライ語:ועדת וינוגרד); the commission's official name is הוועדה לבדיקת ארועי המערכה בלבנון 2006 – "The commission of inquiry into the events of military engagement in Lebanon 2006") is an Israeli government-appointed commission of inquiry, chaired by retired judge Eliyahu Winograd, which investigated and drew lessons from the 2006 Lebanon War (or the Second Lebanon War as it is known in Israel). The Committee had its first plenary session on 18 September 2006 and began summoning and hearing testimonies from witnesses on 2 November of that year. On 30 April 2007 the Commission released its preliminary report, harshly criticizing key decision-makers. At the same time, it has been praised as testimony to the fortitude of Israel's democracy and ability to self-criticize,〔Dana Blander, ("Main Issues in the Interim Report of the Winograd Commission" ), Israel Democracy Institute, 7 May 2007.〕〔Scott MacLeod. ("What the Winograd Report Means for America" ) 03.05.07〕 impressing even Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah. The final Winograd Commission report was announced in Binyanei HaUma in Jerusalem on 30 January 2008. ==Background== (詳細は"Israel: Background and Relations with the United States" ), Congressional Research Service, April 30 2007.〕 During the war the Israeli government provided insufficient material support, including necessities, to the Home Front population of about one million people in northern Israel who were instructed to remain in shelters for much of the war's duration. Government support networks were not activated or were inadequately run. Much of the burden to care for vulnerable populations was left to individual volunteers and charities. The conditions of, and access to, shelters were often substandard and government assistance to northern Israelis in transportation and accommodations in central and southern Israel was highly lacking. Government inaction caused the weakest segments of Israeli society in affected areas to suffer the worst of the day-to-day privations.〔("Northern Israel exodus leaves old, weak and poor to face rockets" ), OCHA, 4 August 2006〕〔("Poll: Most residents of north stayed in north during Lebanon war" ), ''Haaretz'', 21 September 2006〕〔("'The Israeli New Orleans': Charities, Pols Slam Failures in North" ), ''The Jewish Daily Forward'', 29 September 2006〕 On the military front there were tactical, operative and logistic failures, including the flow of intelligence.〔("'The intelligence didn't reach the troops'" ), ''Haaretz'', 6 May 2007〕 Many Israeli commanders and troops were ill-prepared and ill-trained to meet the combat conditions, in particular, with respect to Hezbollah's use of portable antitank weapons, such as the 9К115-2 Metis-M. Unlike in Gaza and the West Bank, troops inside armor,〔("Tough lessons for Israeli armour" ), ''BBC'', 15 August 2006〕 or taking shelter in houses, became highly vulnerable to these weapons, which led to the majority of Israeli military casualties in the war. As well, with the mobilization of reserve divisions, a host of logistical failures, such as ordnance and food shortages,〔(IDF: Logistics chief didn't say looting of Lebanese shops okay ), ''Haaretz'', 15 August 2006〕 began affecting reserve soldiers. A key strategic question relates to the controversial decision to launch full-scale warfare in response to the abduction of two individual soldiers and killing of eight soldiers in the process.〔It is highly unusual—possibly unique in military history—for a nation to mobilize and engage whole divisions or brigades in response to the death, injury, or abduction of individual soldiers, as was the case with the kidnapping of Ehud Goldwasser and Eldad Regev which led to the war, and a few months earlier, with the kidnapping of Gilad Shalit which led to the 2006 Israel-Gaza conflict.〕 After the war, increasing public criticism and protest over these issues was placed on Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, especially to have him call for the establishment of a Supreme Court-appointed state commission of inquiry to look at all levels of government and the military (including the prime minister and chief of staff). For a time it was unclear which of the three areas—cabinet, military, and civilian homefront—would be investigated by whom, and how. On 28 August, Olmert announced the creation of a governmental inspection probe led by former director of Mossad Nahum Admoni; it became the prototype for the Winograd Commission. A military inspection probe, led by former Chief of Staff, Amnon Lipkin-Shahak which on 22 August ceased work after five days of operations due to increasing public dissatisfaction and calls for a state commission, was also set to be renewed. Olmert hinted that the State Comptroller would examine the civilian homefront, to the public consternation of the latter.〔("State Comptroller: Don't need PM's authorization to probe war" ), ''Ynetnews'', 29 August 2006〕〔("PMO 'amazed' at comptroller's public complaints" ), ''Jerusalem Post'', 29 August 2006〕 In response to these growing criticisms, Olmert chose to replace Admoni with retired judge Eliyahu Winograd as chair of the governmental inspection probe (with Olmert thereby responding to calls that any leading commission or probe needs to be headed by a retired judge); the probe itself, turned into a commission with a wider mandate, amounting to near-equal authority to a state commission. 〔("Winograd will head the inspection commission; Sheetrit: I'll ensure that the commission "will have teeth" ), ''Haaretz'', 11 September 2006 〕 抄文引用元・出典: フリー百科事典『 ウィキペディア（Wikipedia）』 ■ウィキペディアで「Winograd Commission」の詳細全文を読む スポンサード リンク
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